Tuesday, April 13, 2010

Genocide Watch Article - February 2010


Blurring Transitional Justice in Orania and Pailin
Kyle Delbyck, Documentation Center of Cambodia
Magazine: Searching for the Truth, February 2010

*names of interviewees have been changed

“The past is not dead. In fact, it’s not even the past.” William Faulkner’s words hold resonance in post-conflict societies throughout the world. With “drawing a line under the past” no longer considered a feasible solution, countries recovering from political violence must decide what route to take in confronting legacies of repression and bloodshed.[1] All too frequently, post-conflict discourse assumes a mutually exclusive framework, the new regime faced with the choice to pursue either justice or reconciliation. The ensuing debate over remedial mechanisms oftentimes results in the construction of two supposedly discrete categories: war crimes tribunal and truth commission, the first associated primarily with justice, the latter primarily with reconciliation. In response, many have disputed the validity of the dichotomous approach, arguing that justice and reconciliation blur together during the rebuilding period. From this perspective, the relationship between transitional mechanisms and the recovery process does not operate on a linear trajectory. Post-conflict reconstruction is instead rife with deviations, potholes, and blind-spots, a hazy web of overlap and crisscross that renders any universalist interpretation futile. “Blurring Transitional Justice in Orania and Pailin” takes a stand in this ideological tug of war through case studies of Orania, South Africa, and Pailin, Cambodia. Interviews with local residents shed light on the failures of rigid paradigms, instead lending credence to theories that embrace the “blurring” of it all.

    Orania, a small town in the Karoo, was founded in the early 1990s, in the midst of South Africa’s democratic transition. Established by conservative Afrikaners dissatisfied with the new, post-apartheid South Africa, the settlement has attracted both individuals affiliated with the former National Party government and proponents of a separatist Afrikaner homeland. The province of Pailin, meanwhile, previously a prosperous mining area, served as a Khmer Rouge stronghold during the reign of Democratic Kampuchea. In the aftermath of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, many Khmer Rouge soldiers fled to the province, taking advantage of Pailin’s border location to launch a guerilla civil war. One of the last areas integrated into the new government, Pailin spent several decades under Khmer Rouge control and, like Orania, is home to a number of former regime members.

  The two regions are unique and, as such, admittedly constitute a particular window into post-conflict issues. Given their histories, however, the experiences of Orania and Pailin provide valuable insights into how justice and reconciliation manifest themselves during the transitional period. South Africa and Cambodia have taken vastly different paths in their respective quests to deal with the past. The post-apartheid African National Congress government implemented the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a public mechanism that addressed crimes committed between 1960 and 1994, the heart of the apartheid era. In the pursuit of historical “truth,” the commission offered perpetrators amnesty in exchange for full disclosure of their actions. Cambodia, on the other hand, recently established the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, a war crimes tribunal in the process of prosecuting several high-ranking Khmer Rouge leaders. While the ECCC has limited its scope to senior officials, proponents conceive of the court as a means of challenging impunity and establishing accountability for Democratic Kampuchea crimes.[2] Positioned at the crux of controversial attempts at transitional justice, residents within Pailin and Orania had much to say about the success of reconstruction efforts and the extent to which their respective countries have achieved the goals of justice and reconciliation. What can locals tell us about the use of dichotomous models? Do their views legitimize a universalist understanding of transitional mechanisms? Or do their perceptions of post-conflict recovery call for more fluid modes of analysis?

   The experiences of Orania and Pailin tend to undermine the traditional alignment of commission with reconciliation and tribunal with justice. As referenced above, war crimes trials are often perceived as threats to processes of reconciliation. Political leaders and scholars alike have repeatedly stated that retributive punishment exacerbates tensions and, in the worst-case scenarios, incites further violence. In Cambodia, ECCC advocates encountered significant resistance from those who claimed that a far-reaching penal mechanism would destabilize the country. Reflecting on the tribunal’s impact thus far, however, Pailin residents consistently expressed the opinion that Cambodia has attained reconciliation. Some interviewees even cited the tribunal as a significant catalyst in peace-building efforts. Former Khmer Rouge cadre Dara, for example, noted of the ECCC, “ by prosecuting these people, we as Cambodians can help national reconciliation and move forward and develop the country.” While this positive conception of the tribunal depends on its narrow punitive scope, the ECCC itself did not appear to generate the widespread hostility predicted by prevailing transitional justice theories.

    Such theories often depict post-conflict nations as societies forced into an unenviable dilemma, a “cruel short-term tradeoff between reconciliation and justice.” In terms of tribunals, this “tradeoff” manifests itself in the swap of appeasement for the prize of accountability.[3] Truth commissions, on the other hand, supposedly submit to the opposite exchange, forfeiting justice for the sake of peace-building. In response, Pailin residents contested the terms of this bartering process. Like Dara. Laska, a Khmer Rouge medic, regards the tribunal as a vehicle to “make sure people live peacefully together”: his statement resists the “either/or” framework. Correspondingly, Sovannah, a high-ranking former soldier, remarked, “the tribunal will help people talk to each other and be able to forgive and forget.” Though numerous interviewees expressed fears that the ECCC will eventually turn its sights on lower level cadres, they did not criticize the tribunal for increasing communal friction or hindering reconciliation efforts.

        Comments like Sovannah’s are even more striking when compared with the tone of Orania residents’ reactions to the TRC. As noted previously, truth commissions are by and large considered a far more effective peace-building mechanism than the punitive hand of tribunals. While it is widely acknowledged that disputes over historical “truth” possess the potential to divide a populace, commission-like mechanisms tend to be associated with the goals of forgiveness, pacification, cathartic healing, and understanding. South Africa went so far as to christen its transitional endeavor by placing truth and reconciliation in conjunction, an appellative alliance that has permanently shaped societal notions of the purpose of such mechanisms. In contrast, no war crimes tribunal has thus far included “reconciliation” in its official title. Taking into account the sentiments voiced in Pailin and Orania, however, one would think the opposite was true. Without fail, Orania interviewees blamed the commission for alienating South Africa’s Afrikaner population. Despite the commission’s stated goals of compassion and acceptance, Orania official Johan’s description of the process as a “witch hunt on one side” reflects the bitterness that pervaded all references to the TRC.  Several locals labeled the hearings a tool to “other” Afrikaners, forcing the entire community to take responsibility for apartheid crimes.

    Even the commission’s amnesty provisions did not mollify Orania locals. Instead, in the eyes of interviewees, the immunity compromise was inconsequential, engulfed by the commission’s overarching message of antagonism: the insinuation that “Afrikaners are a people who need to make room for other people.” As such, former soldier Henrik conceives of the Afrikaner population as “flattened by the accusations,” isolated within the new South Africa and far removed from any form of meaningful reconciliation. The contrast between this alleged “flattening” and the optimism expressed by Pailin residents raises several questions. Why, in these two cases, were normative alignments turned on their heads? What contributing factors have shaped locals’ ideas about justice and reconciliation? In what ways do the experiences of those who call Pailin and Orania home expose the limitations of dichotomous paradigms?

      Time and again, interviewees pointed to the societal standing of former regime members as playing a large role in the reconciliation process, disrupting the “traditional” functions of tribunal and commission. Khmer Rouge soldiers like Dara and Laska, for example, seemingly satisfied with Cambodia’s post-conflict transition, linked the success of peace-building efforts to the integration of Khmer Rouge leaders into the new government. Citing the prominent position of numerous such cadres in both the Pailin municipality and national administration, Bunthan, a high ranking chief under Democratic Kampuchea, remarked, “with Khmer Rouge cadres here in government, we are now all together and want to live in peace, helping to better the future of the country.” Fellow soldier Terit likewise noted, “ I feel like a part of society since integration, because I see people like myself in leadership-the Khmer Rouge are now united with the government and we can work as one.”  From the perspective of interviewees, the power held by the Men Sam Ans and Chea Sims of Cambodia has facilitated reconciliation and diminished societal tensions. Furthermore, several Pailin residents identified their own government careers after integration as an important factor in preventing the marginalization experienced by Orania locals. Terit, for example, had a difficult time even understanding why he might feel excluded from post-Khmer Rouge Cambodia, commenting, “ I served as a government soldier, received salary from the government, so of course am a part of society.” Therefore, in evaluating the impact of the ECCC, the significance of the integration process should not be underestimated.  In Pailin at least, the absorption of Democratic Kampuchea officials into the state apparatus has detracted from the “justice over reconciliation” sacrifice, curbing the brunt of potential hostility toward the tribunal.

    Conversely, in Orania, the political concessions correlated with the TRC have rendered the supposed “reconciliation over justice” exchange moot.  Residents frequently drew a connection between their frustration with the commission and the lack of Afrikaner representation in the new ANC government. Johan, for example, stated, “it is difficult to get things close to your heart on the agenda, being a minority...” Others attributed their sense of alienation to the shock of transitioning from an Afrikaner-run National Party government to an ANC regime devoid of Afrikaner influence. The disorientation produced by this shift permeated the interviews, with volkstaat pioneer Hans observing, “this had been a confused experience for Afrikaners, who do not know what their future is, or what to expect, or where they are going.” Orania’s prevailing climate of “confusion” and isolation stands in stark contrast to the atmosphere in Pailin, where residents consistently expressed confidence in both their own positions and Cambodia’s future as a nation.

      For South Africans like Hans, lacking Pailin locals’ sense of security, the repositioning of state power structures vastly overshadowed the TRC’s attempts at reconciliation. Furthermore, in light of transformed political dynamics, the commission’s role in exposing the crimes of National Party members assumed heightened significance, perceived as just another step in the “psychological oppression” of Afrikaners. Conservative political leader Wilhelm’s quote says it all: “we saw SABC evening after evening with ANC people testifying, women crying, getting emotional, and they would blame us all as these bad whites.” Wilhelm does not draw attention to the amnesty process or Desmond Tutu’s message of forgiveness. Instead, the alienation engendered by the terms of the peace settlement leads to words of resentment and division, the type of statement one might expect in the context of a tribunal.

    Similar to the influence of such political compromises, the history behind the two countries’ respective conflicts has also molded local impressions of transitional mechanisms. While this may appear an obvious point, it is habitually ignored in favor of the temptations of clarity, the allure of drawing lines between commission and tribunal, reconciliation and justice. Comments made by interviewees expose such lines as vulnerable in the face of historical forces. Former Khmer Rouge soldiers, for example, consistently brought up national traditions of harmony and cultural homogeny, lamenting the shame of any conflict “between Khmer and Khmer.” As Terit stated, “there is no use for Khmer people to fight Khmer people, only we suffer. I am not upset with either side, the government or Pol Pot, I am just happy to see the war end.” Pailin residents accordingly appeared receptive to the idea of reconciliation, confident in the healing powers of common ancestry and repulsed by the prospect of another civil war. Citing historical precedent, Bunthan pointed to the Khmer people’s combined power in challenging French colonialism, deeming the independence movement an example of the country’s ability to “come together as one.”

Others referenced Cambodia’s history of uniting behind strong leaders. Sidestepping the issue that Democratic Kampuchea exemplifies this type of cohesion, locals expressed certainty that the populace will put old grudges aside and join forces to support Hun Sen’s administration and the ECCC. Such assertions stem from a past in which grassroots opposition to repressive governments has been sparse: democratic resistance has not featured heavily in Cambodia’s political development. As former Khmer Rouge bureaucrat Rakana stated, “whatever governmental policy is, I will follow it. I abided by the rules of the old regime and I will do the same with the rules of the Hun Sen regime. As the government has endorsed the tribunal, it is not my position to criticize it. Instead, all Khmer people will go along with it.” Laska likewise remarked, “ it is the government’s choice to create the tribunal, I do not know about politics, I will respect their decision, like everyone else.” As evidenced by the above comments, interviewees conceive of their positions in the current administration as a direct continuation of their positions in Democratic Kampuchea: citizens obligated to comply with the course of action prescribed by ruling authorities. Consequently, in light of this legacy of authoritarian governance, Hun Sen’s sponsorship of the ECCC has significantly reduced the risk of widespread unrest or opposition. Instead, cadres such as Sovannah proclaimed a desire to move forward en masse under the government’s directive, fulfilling their historical roles with “no separation between different groups of Khmer people, victims and perpetrators.”

     In contrast, Orania residents repeatedly pointed to South Africa’s history of racial division in their critiques of the TRC, labeling preceding centuries of ethnic strife a major impediment to the country’s transformation into a so-called rainbow nation. Without Cambodia’s “common ancestry” to rely upon, interviewees asserted that different groups within South Africa do not possess a shared national experience or sense of cohesive identity. Several mentioned the first Boer settlements, the subsequent British concentration camps, and the segregating nature of the industrial revolution in their attempts to explain continuing hostilities. Others cited past Afrikaner efforts to create separate homelands, or volkstaats, stating that the issue of societal discord stretches far beyond the relatively recent actions of the apartheid government. As such, lacking evidence of the country’s potential to unite, interviewees were much less trusting in the remedial powers of the TRC. While Pailin resident Dara commented of former Khmer Rouge members, “we are not alone,” seclusion and marginalization are defining elements of the Afrikaner mindset, the psychological consequence of complex historical dynamics. As illustrated by the telling disparity between Dara’s proclamation and Oranian conceptions of reconciliation, the unique trajectory of every society’s political evolution shapes local views on post-conflict reconstruction. It is accordingly impossible to create universal guidelines as to how nations will react to transitional mechanisms. The contradictory experiences of Orania and Pailin prove this point, thus problematizing normative understandings of justice and reconciliation.

  
Part Two

The flaws in intellectually rigid interpretations of transitional justice are further revealed by interviewees’ commentary on the respective “stories” promoted by the ECCC and TRC. Their conflicting interpretations of historical narrative reflect the problems inherent in limiting notions of justice to retribution. In recent years, post-conflict scholars have developed a model of accountability that extends beyond traditional justice paradigms. Restorative justice, as this model has been labeled, is a term that “encompasses a growing social movement to institutionalize peaceful approaches to harm, problem-solving and violations of legal and human rights.”[4]  Such “peaceful approaches” place emphasis on rebuilding broken communities and relationships, engaging both victims and perpetrators in processes that benefit society as a whole. Truth commissions, reparations payments, enhanced social services, school renovations, perpetrator apologies, and the like all fall under the purview of the restorative method. In response to this practice, some scholars have argued that restorative remedies represent a less meaningful form of justice, a poor substitute for retributive penalties.

   Conversations with Orania and Pailin residents, however, expose justice to be a more complex, capricious creature. Challenging narrow ideological frameworks, locals in the two regions serve as evidence of the many different ways in which accountability can manifest itself.  As noted above, the primary objective of war crimes tribunals is the effective prosecution of conflict “perpetrators” and the consequent establishment of legal precedent. From a long-term perspective, accountability mechanisms, the ECCC included, hope to challenge the impunity of previous eras and, through retributive punishment, achieve justice for conflict victims. Tribunals accordingly focus on the specific cases that come before the court, leaving the creation of a broader historical narrative to other sectors of society. In contrast, truth commissions often set their foremost goal as the construction of a definitive historical account: allocating responsibility for bloodshed, debunking any remaining myths, explaining underlying causes of conflict, setting the record straight about controversial incidents, and so on. Interviewees’ remarks shed light on the important role this narrative plays in holding perpetrators responsible for their actions. While the restorative justice model includes truth recovery under its comprehensive umbrella, the experiences of Pailin and Orania locals suggest that historical narrative should occupy a leading position in societal conceptions of accountability.

    Turning first to Cambodia, Pailin residents spoke of the ECCC in an untroubled manner, seemingly impervious to the ongoing proceedings. Time and again, former Khmer Rouge soldiers failed to correlate the tribunal with any substantive verdict on the actions of the DK regime. Instead, interviewees described the process in narrow terms, concentrating on the court’s prosecution of five senior leaders. Dara, for example, remarked, “a country has to have a court in order to practice the law, with the courts and with this tribunal, they find out whether people are guilty or innocent, then find out who made mistakes and did bad things.” In this quote, Dara depicts the tribunal as a mechanism concerned solely with the legal system; unrelated to the formation of historical narrative. Sovannah likewise noted, “I don’t think the trial is saying whether I am a good or bad person, the government never said anything like that or considered our group a bad group.” Taking such comments into account, interviewees do not believe the tribunal has passed moral judgment on their individual roles under the Democratic Kampuchea government.

     The TRC’s mission, on the other hand, centered on the “investigation and establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights,” exploring who was responsible for the apartheid system and whence unequal political structures originated.[5] Fully aware of the scope of the commission’s aspirations, Orania residents interpreted the hearings as a broader societal condemnation of the Afrikaner community. Along this line, Wilhelm stated that the TRC’s account of events severely damaged Afrikaner morale. In his eyes, the commission was “used as an instrument to depict some as good guys and others as bad guys and to add credibility to that.” Others labeled the process a “big theater” and a “one sided opening of a can of worms.” As illustrated by the resentment evident in the aforementioned remarks, disagreements over historical narrative can throw a wrench into the traditional grouping of commission with reconciliation and justice with tribunal. In certain cases, a former regime member may find it more painful to witness the government he served being publicly condemned than to see a fellow soldier face jail time: the officially sanctioned destruction or, at the very least, critique of one’s deep-seated ideology is potentially devastating, striking at the heart of personal identity.

     Analyzing the effects of this type of ideological scrutiny, post-conflict expert Michael Ignatieff theorizes that, while commissions rarely produce the whole truth, they are valuable in that they “narrow the range of permissible lies.”[6] The TRC, its flaws notwithstanding, was able to establish certain indisputable truths, opening the country’s eyes to the horrors of apartheid.[7] Though certain parts of South African history remain points of fierce contention, the commission created the public consensus that apartheid was an unjust and shameful system. As such, Orania interviewees, loath to unequivocally denounce the regime, nonetheless acknowledged the “indisputable truths” generated by the commission’s historical narrative. Wilhelm, for example, admitted that the TRC resulted in “baseline facts,” whilst Hans deemed evidence of apartheid’s brutality “undeniable.” All thus conceded that the position of blacks under the National Party government was indefensible, “a real nightmare.” Bearing such observations in mind, it becomes evident that Orania residents have mulled over the moral implications of the regime, confronted with facts and stories antithetical to their convictions.

     Furthermore, throughout the course of the interviews, each person inevitably cited a moment in history when he or she felt the apartheid system veered off its ethical tracks: during the “integration of black labor” into cities, amidst the deterioration of the security situation in the townships, and so on. Though some took care to also highlight positive aspects of National Party doctrine, the thoughtfulness of their responses and the numerous references to historical turning points support the conclusion that interviewees have spent time contemplating the apartheid legacy. Henrik, for instance, unable to ignore the sins of the past, noted, “these things are difficult to explain today.” Why the recurrent attempts to “explain” and analyze apartheid brutality? Most interviewees invoked the TRC’s account of apartheid as the catalyst for their reflections on the National Party system, bemoaning the impossibility of escaping the din generated by the commission’s historical narrative. Consequently, the popular perception that South African whites got off scot free, rewarded by the TRC’s amnesty stipulations, is valid only if one focuses exclusively on tangible penalties. Disregarding the significance of ideological and psychological ramifications is a mistake. As Afrikaner scholar Lize Van Roebbreck puts it, the commission made it impossible for “whites in South Africa to remain blind to the immorality of apartheid” and thereby impossible for those implicated in the system to emerge from the period with fully clear consciences. Is this purging of “blindness” not some form of justice or, at the very least, punishment?

    On the other hand, interviewees in Pailin appeared content to remain in the dark, unruffled by the specter of the past and unscathed by the scrutiny of historical narrative. Without fail, former cadres admitted that they had not devoted much energy to pondering Democratic Kampuchea, instead rarely affording their actions a second thought. Terit, for example, stated, “I never look back and do not think about it. Everything keeps moving forward and there is no need to look back.” Laska similarly remarked, “I don’t think about it, I am a good citizen.” Unlike the TRC hearings, the ECCC process thus far does not seem to have either upset interviewees or roused them to evaluate the ethos of the Khmer Rouge system. Furthermore, several former soldiers went so far as to deny that the regime had committed any serious crimes. In this vein, Bunthan commented, “ life during Democratic Kampuchea, it was not wrong, it was autonomous. I did not see the loss of life…” Conceding that there were issues with living standards and freedom of movement, Bunthan nevertheless believes that “people loved the regime because it was so pure, there was no corruption, and people lived equally.” The representation of the Khmer Rouge as a benevolent force formed a common refrain throughout the interviews. Like Bunthan, Rakana argued that claims of suffering under Democratic Kampuchea were exaggerated, as she herself “did not witness any killing” and considers Khieu Samphan, Ieng Sary, and their brethren “good and simple people.” When questioned as to how she behaves when interacting with victims, Rakana noted, “I feel normal, because I don’t believe anything actually happened.”  Employing the same line of reasoning, a number of other former cadres asserted that neither they themselves nor Khmer Rouge leaders had anything to apologize for.

     Before commencing upon further analysis of the interviews, it would be irresponsible to ignore the fact that Orania interviewees are positioned in an educational culture that places more emphasis on the apartheid regime than its Cambodian counterpart does on the Khmer Rouge era. The contrast between statements like Rakana’s and Orania locals’ sophisticated conceptions of apartheid reflect the fact that Cambodians and Afrikaners have undergone vastly different systems of schooling, a disparity that has contributed to their perspectives on historical narrative. However, this recognition of the potent effects of education does not detract from the similarly potent effects of transitional justice mechanisms, the subject that this article has set as its focus. The two instead merge, along with the host of factors discussed above, to produce the political and social climate within which former Khmer Rouge members developed the lack of remorse palpable throughout their remarks. Accordingly, Pailin interviewees’ ability to deflect the burden of inward reflection, a burden that has etched its mark on the shoulders of Orania residents, partially stems from the absence of a process comparable to the TRC: a public mechanism (whether in the form of a commission, a comprehensive history education curriculum, or an informal initiative) that has made it its mission to produce a widely accepted historical narrative and “narrow the range of permissible lies.” The ECCC has certainly set admirable goals for itself, such as the reduction of impunity, the inclusion of victims’ voices, the establishment of legal precedent, the prosecution of senior Khmer Rouge officials, and so on. This article does not seek to undermine the tribunal’s achievements or claim that the intangible holds greater importance than the tangible. Nonetheless, its triumphs notwithstanding, the ECCC has not provided for a definitive verdict on the regime as a whole, thereby allowing Pailin interviewees the wiggle room to continue living their lives in the “blindness” denied to Orania residents: an undeserved freedom comparable to more commonly recognized modes of impunity. Comments made by former Khmer Rouge members, like those of Orania locals, thus demand that post-conflict discourse recognize historical narrative as a powerful and effective medium of accountability. Moreover, as with the problems inherent in creating an automatic alliance between truth commission and reconciliation, the experiences of interviewees illustrate the issues in restricting justice to the domain of a tribunal. In both cases, the groupings prove themselves to be invalid.

     In light of the failings of “unblurred” paradigms, interviews in Orania and Pailin suggest that post-conflict societies should pursue a multi-faceted approach towards transitional justice, utilizing a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. In employing processes that complement each other, countries in the midst of difficult transitions will ensure that they address the challenges of rebuilding from a sufficient number of angles. If Cambodia had chosen to solely implement a tribunal, for example, the country would have disregarded the impact of historical narrative. Instead, with the introduction of genocide education textbooks and the possibility of future grassroots truth-telling mechanisms, the post-Khmer Rouge populace has taken crucial steps towards recovery. This symbiotic union of different methodologies acknowledges the need to broaden societal notions of justice and reconciliation, anticipating the whole range of potential outcomes and thereby guaranteeing that glaring issues are not overlooked.

     As far as these “outcomes” go, within the framework of normative discourse, Orania and Pailin simply do not make sense. If one adheres to universalist paradigms, it is surprising that the TRC has generated such hostility amongst Afrikaners: surprising that, while the commission achieved some justice by means of historical truth-telling, it did not facilitate a greater level of reconciliation in Orania. Moreover, though it was initially assumed that a tribunal would divide South Africa and derail the peace-building process, in retrospect, it is possible that an ECCC- style mechanism would have resulted in less mistrust and hostility. In terms of Cambodia, again utilizing normative criteria, it is similarly surprising that the tribunal has not inspired a large amount of bitterness in Pailin. Soldiers’ comments instead indicate that a comprehensive truth recovery mechanism, despite its lack of retributive penalties, might have inflicted a more meaningful form of punishment on former cadres. In the context of post-conflict transitions, the list of so-called “unforeseen” results goes on and on, by no means limited to the small regions of Orania and Pailin.

   Why these seemingly erratic results? Why do case studies of Orania and Pailin defy standard models of the rebuilding process? In conclusion, the answer lies in the recognition that justice and reconciliation simply cannot be placed in finite categories. Each contains elements of the other, and, over the course of reconstruction efforts, the two blur, oftentimes almost indistinguishable. Accordingly, in evaluating justice and reconciliation and their relationships to various transitional justice mechanisms, the creation of dichotomous classifications is an untenable juxtaposition; any such universalist framework belies the complexities of the post-conflict experience. To sum up, allow me to turn to a hypothetical example of the “blurring” process. Speculating as to the possible effects of “A History of Democratic Kampuchea,” the new Cambodian history textbook, it is likely that improvements in genocide education will bring about justice through the aforementioned “narrowing of the range of permissible lies,” which could subsequently lead to resentment amongst former Khmer Rouge cadres. Following the chain of potential consequences even further, however, initial tensions could eventually ricochet back towards reconciliation, the dissemination of the “lessons of history” laying the seeds for national peace. In turn, the lessons themselves can alternately be conceived of as a form of justice for victims, an attempt to ensure that the past does not repeat itself and that no more Cambodians fall prey to intra-Khmer violence. Puzzling through this hazy mess of ideas is certainly a formidable undertaking. However, if post-conflict societies hope to ever move on from their turbulent pasts, it is essential that they deny themselves the safe haven of easy answers. The stories of locals in Orania and Pailin chip away at any such refuge of simplicity, challenging us all to delve beyond our core assumptions and explore murkier waters, the undercurrents of a world in which the past is not the past and things are not always as they seem.


[1] Lundy, Patricia, and Mark McGovern. "Attitudes towards a Truth Commission for Northern Ireland in Relation to Party Political Affiliation." Journal of Irish Political Studies. 22. (2007)

[2] Scheffer, David. "Why the Cambodia Tribunal Matters to the International Community." Cambodia Tribunal Monitor..

[3] Lerche III, Charles O. "Truth Commissions and National Reconciliation: Some Reflections on Theory and Practice."Network of Peace and Conflict Studies, George Mason University. .

[4] "What is Restorative Justice?." Suffolk University, Center for Restorative Justice..

[5] Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. No. 34. (1995)

[6] Ignatieff, Michael. The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience. Chatto and Windus, 1998. 174.

[7] Fullard, Madeline, and Nicky Rousseau. "An Imperfect Past: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Transition."Human Sciences Research Council. (2004).

Genocide Watch Article - 17 November 2009


17 November 2009 “South Africa Is Divided on Gesture by Educator”, By BARRY BEARAK, New York Times

BLOEMFONTEIN, South Africa — For a speech about reconciliation it could hardly have been more divisive. Jonathan D. Jansen, the new head of the University of the Free State, spoke of the “place of infamy” just 100 yards behind him, the residence hall where four white students last year made a racist video that incited outrage across the country.


Those students had been expelled, but now the new rector announced that they were welcome to return, pardoned of any further campus discipline. The young men may have been racially troubled, he explained, but the bigger problem lay with the university, which itself was racist.

Moses Masitha, the student body president, was seated just a few feet away as Mr. Jansen, mellifluous as he is provocative, delivered his 4,100-word inaugural address. “It was a good speech until he said he was going to drop the charges and then my head just sank,” he said. “You knew there was going to be a backlash. I wondered, ‘Has he spoken to anyone about this?’ ”

The video, meant to protest the idea of racial integration in student housing, showed a young man apparently urinating into a bowl of stew. The food was then served to five black house cleaners — known in the dorms as “squeezas” — as they guilelessly cooperated in a mock initiation.

Once transferred to a computer, the video made the digital leap from an inside joke in a single dormitory to an international scandal on the World Wide Web. Fifteen years after apartheid, South Africa was left to ponder not only the ghosts of its racist past but also the demons of its racist present.

And now Mr. Jansen, the first black man to lead the 27,000-student, 105-year-old university, was inviting back the culpable whites without even demanding an apology.

“Those boys treated us like we were no more than toilets and now we are being treated that way again by Jonathan Jansen,” one of the workers, Rebecca Adams, complained.

Another of the humiliated workers, Mittah Ntlatseng, said: “These boys have to be trained that we are human beings just like them. Here I am, taking pills for blood pressure and stress. Does Jansen care about that?” Mr. Jansen’s Oct. 16 “gesture of racial reconciliation,” which included a promise of reparations for the workers, was in most ways largely symbolic.

Two of the four students had graduated before the video went viral. The two others were unlikely to return, Mr. Jansen said in an interview. Criminal prosecution of the four is continuing.

But his gesture — the audacity of his forgiveness — dominated South Africa’s headlines for weeks, firing a controversy that continues to emit heat.

Mr. Jansen most certainly has his champions. He was already a highly regarded educator, a Fulbright scholar with a Ph.D. from Stanford. Now he is also praised for his courage.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu, a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, called him a “great man” whose inauguration speech displayed the bold and merciful spirit of Jesus. “Forgiveness is not for sissies,” the archbishop said. But many others considered Mr. Jansen’s action to be insensitive and arrogant. Who was he to pardon those who had blackened the eye of the nation?

Themba Maseko, the chief government spokesman, said that the welfare of the perpetrators had been given preference over that of the victims. Students, primarily blacks, marched on the campus’s main building and demanded the rector’s resignation. Thabo Meeko, the local chairman of the governing party’s youth league, said Mr. Jansen should be shot and killed like a criminal.

These past few weeks, the rector has agreed to hold talks with anyone who wants to discuss his decision, “to try to find consensus on a way forward.” He looks for ways to further explain his thinking.

Mr. Jansen arrived on campus in July. While delightfully picturesque, the university, located in this city in the nation’s central farm belt, is regrettably segregated, Mr. Jansen said in an interview. Courses are taught in two languages. Whites gravitate to classes in Afrikaans, the mother tongue of the descendants of Dutch settlers. Blacks, by and large, attend classes conducted in English.

“I asked to see the choir, and they came to me with two choir directors, the black conductor doing black music and the white conductor doing European music,” Mr. Jansen said. “I go to the senate, which is the academic body of the university, and it’s all white except for two or three guys from Ghana or someplace. And I looked at this and said, ‘Oh my God, no wonder we have this problem.’ We were sitting on a time bomb.”

Mr. Jansen, 53, speaks in a theatrical style, bringing to mind in both charisma and bulk the actor James Earl Jones.

His latest book, “Knowledge in the Blood,” explores the inherited beliefs of the nation’s white students. Many grew up in an Afrikaner culture that is frequently out of step with post-apartheid South Africa, he writes. These young people are often desperate to preserve their culture and language. Churches and schools are considered last bastions of a way of life.

Speaking of his initial days on campus, Mr. Jansen tells the story of white students who asked if they could say a blessing for him. “So off I go” to their church, he said, “and I see a bunch of black kids with Bibles going in the other direction. I jumped out of my car and said, ‘Excuse me, where are you going?’ ” The blacks were going to their own church.

“So the whole setup — spiritually, socially, culturally, academically — has been to be separate, and no one has done anything about it,” he said.

In this, the campus here is hardly alone. Last year’s scandal provoked a government inquiry into racism on university campuses. It concluded that the problem was pervasive: more needed to be done to challenge misconceptions and prejudices, especially among young Afrikaners.

At the University of the Free State, the previous rector had tried a gradual approach to integrating the residences. For the most part, black students had been willing to live in predominantly white dorms but the same was not true the other way around. White students moved off campus instead.

In his speech, Mr. Jansen announced that he would be more insistent. A new school year begins in January, and the residences are to be integrated on a 50-50 basis for all incoming freshmen, he said. Part of a university education will be whites and blacks learning how to live together.

To accomplish that, the culture of the residences must change, he added. The “mindless rituals” of the Afrikaner students will be forbidden: the hazing and the enforced deference, with younger housemates made to refer to older ones as “uncle.”

Whites are generally fearful of what is to come. “Why are we being made to give up our traditions?” asked Christiaan Steenkamp, a white student living in an overwhelmingly white residence hall. “It’s not races that are clashing; it’s cultures. We should be allowed to keep our culture.”

He thought hard to find an example. “Blacks are louder than whites,” he said. “That’s not race. It’s culture. It’s the way they are. Why can’t Jansen recognize that and quit treating us like we’re a bunch of racists?”

Copyright 2009 The New York Times

Genocide Watch Article - 16 April 2009

This article can be found on Genocide Watch, Resources, By Region, Africa, Southern Africa, South Africa.

Land grab spreads to South Africa as mob seizes farm

Jonathan Clayton in Pietermaritzburg, South Africa, From Times Online

April 16, 2009

An armed mob, angered over the slow pace of land reform benefits, has launched a Zimbabwean-style invasion of one of South Africa’s new multi-million pound showpiece agricultural reform projects, the biggest yet in value instituted by the post-apartheid government.

Government sources said a mob, armed with knives and machetes, had seized control of Forana farm in the rich farming area of Mpumalanga province over the Easter weekend after threatening and driving off local managers and staff employed by the new owners, a black-run farming cooperative.

The 3200 hectare farm is part of Tenbosch estate, a Rand 10 billion (£740 million) land-restitution project. It is made up of several farms handed back to four local communities who progressively lost their historic land under apartheid legislation since 1923.

Invaders, mirroring complaints in rural communities across the country, are angry over the few benefits they have seen from the much-heralded land transfer although the new owners made clear it would take several years to turn around land which although originally seized from locals, has been abandoned and neglected for years.

Agribusiness Umlimi, which controls the joint-venture farm management company Makhombo for the Lugedlane community condemned the action as irresponsible and said it compromised farming operations and jeopardised the ultimate flow of benefits to the community.

Fifteen years after the end of apartheid, land reform remains one of the country’s most sensitive issues. Government attempts to redress an imbalance which saw whites holding some 83 percent of all land, have largely failed, angering all sides.

Critics say the programme has simply contributed to destroying viable commercial farming sector by drastically reducing the amount of land available for commercial agriculture without bringing any benefit to rural communities.

“I would say that 95 percent of land transferred under the scheme so far has simply resulted in once productive farms being turned over to subsistence farming,” Chris van Zyl, deputy general manager of the Transvaal Agricultural Union told The Times.

He said the situation had not been helped because the new owners were frequently denied title deeds without which they found it difficult to raise the necessary investment. In addition, white farmers who are keen to sell sometimes have to wait more than two years to receive promised funds from the government. In the meantime they make no investment on the land.

The land bank which organizes such purchases under the current “willing buyer, willing seller” scheme is bankrupt after successive corruption scandals.

“All this has led to a decrease in production and a crisis of food security,” Mr van Zyl added. “You can’t just take land away from one group and hand it to others and expect it to stay productive. The issue is far more complex. Unfortunately it is a very sensitive issue and needs to be handled with care but politicians take advantage of that and whip up expectations which cannot be met.” Emotions are currently running high in South Africa as the country is in the midst of the most closely contested election campaign since democracy in 1994. Opposition parties are highlighting the failure of the ANC to deliver on previous pledges to end poverty and improve life for the black majority - some 85 percent of the population.

Land, land reform and agricultural production are some of the areas where the current government has failed most dramatically to the extent it recently warned black farmers they risked losing the land again under a new “use it or lose it” policy.

Farm invasions stoke fears that South Africa could go the same way as Zimbabwe where a “fast track” programme, aimed at meeting local people’s frustrations, saw white farmers losing farms violently without compensation with disastrous consequences for the broader economy.

Attorney Richard Spoor, who acted for a group of concerned members of the Tenbosch beneficiary community, told the Business Day newspaper the Tenbosch project was a shambles because certain of the new trustees had abused the trust of the community.

Through Makhombo, Umlimi has disbursed hundreds of thousands of pounds to the Lugedlane community in the past three years, but none of the income was passed on to the community, according to the group behind the “invasion”.

Genocide Watch Article - 14 March 2008


March 14, 2008

World Briefing | Africa

In South Africa, Crime Is Child’s Play



JOHANNESBURG — Violence has become so pervasive in South African schools that children as young as 7 play games such as “rape me, rape me,” where students simulate sexual attacks,” according to a chilling report issued Wednesday by the nation’s human rights commission.


The research, which took 18 months to complete, was mostly done in Western  Cape province. Statistics were in short supply because most assaults in schools go unreported, the commission said. But the report asserted that physical attacks were alarmingly commonplace, including a phenomenon known as “corrective rape” where boys assault lesbian students to try to turn them into heterosexuals

Genocide Watch Article - 9 November 2007

This article can be found on Genocide Watch, Resources, By Region, Africa, Southern Africa, South Africa.

November 9, 2007
U.S. Says South Africa Impedes U.N. Motion to Condemn Rape as a Tactic
By WARREN HOGE

UNITED NATIONS, Nov. 8 — The United States accused South Africa on Thursday of obstructing an American-drafted General Assembly resolution that would specifically condemn rape and sexual abuse used by governments and armed groups to achieve political and military objectives.

While the resolution does not mention any countries by name, the Bush administration has cited accusations that rape was being employed by soldiers and militia members as a tactic for intimidation and warfare, notably in Sudan and Myanmar.

“The South African position is shocking,” said Kristen Silverberg, the assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs, given “South Africa’s long struggle against oppression.” She noted that the South African government took a strong domestic position against sexual violence.

Speaking in a telephone interview from Washington, Ms. Silverberg said that the South Africans were demanding watered-down language that would make the resolution one about sexual violence in general rather than one about sexual violence sponsored by governments. “We think there is a real difference between governments that fail to prevent rape and governments that actively promote it, and we do not want the resolution to blur that difference,” she said.

The resolution, which currently has 61 co-sponsors, would also call on the secretary general to report back to the General Assembly on evidence of government-sanctioned rape. Ms. Silverberg described this as a needed backup mechanism that did not exist in any of the many international conventions and resolutions on sexual abuse.
 
“We want the secretary general with all the power behind his office to shine a spotlight on this specific form of abuse,” she said. Asked about Ms. Silverberg’s expression of shock at South Africa’s position, Baso Sangqu, the country’s deputy ambassador, said, “I am shocked about that statement because we have been working very closely within the African group to find agreement on this resolution.”

He said, “We are objecting to the resolution because it is politicized and singles out clear categories of rape. We want a resolution that is nonpoliticized and that looks at rape in a holistic manner in all its situations including rape by soldiers in detention centers and in situations of foreign occupation.” American officials said that South Africa initially tried to portray its position as one that enjoyed the support of the 43-nation African  group at the United Nations. When American diplomats made inquiries inindividual capitals, however, they said, they found this not to be true, and three African countries, Burundi, Congo and Liberia, have signed on as co-sponsors.

Since beginning its two-year term as a member of the Security Council in January, South Africa has continually been criticized at home and by longtime supporters abroad for withholding the same sorts of international human rights condemnations at the United Nations that helped end apartheid. In the cases of Myanmar and Zimbabwe, two notorious rights violators, South Africa moved to tone down or prevent harsh actions by the Council. And it has resisted proposals for strict measures by the Council put forward by Britain, France and the United States to curb Iran’s nuclear program, even though South Africa is the only country ever to have renounced its nuclear program of its own accord.

The United States had hoped for a vote on Friday, but Ms. Silverberg said that was now in doubt because of the persistent South African demands for changes. “We would like to have a vote as soon as we have a resolution that reflects the interests of the victims rather than the interests of the government,” she said.

Genocide Watch Article - 22 August 2003

This article can be found on Genocide Watch, Resources, By Region, Africa, Southern Africa, South Africa.

Farmers tortured and murdered due to "racial hatred" - farm attack official investigation report latest available SA government statistics:

1991 to 2001 - 6,112 farm attacks, 1,254 people killed
2001 - 1,011 farm attacks, 147 people killed
2002 - 1,000 farm attacks, 112 people killed
Totals: 9,154 farm attacks, 1,613 people killed

Names of victims and the farm deathsrecorded by Censorbugbear and Crime Busters of South Africa in 2003: http://www.100megspop2.com/crimebusters/FarmVictims.html

AUGUST 22, 2003 -- RACIAL HATRED is the main cause of the incredibly high violence- and cruelty level which specifically target the primarily Afrikaner victims of farm attacks. This is one of the shock findings of the long-awaited farm attack report, which the Afrikaans-language Beeld newspaper has managed to publish in spite of the decision yesterday by the South African government security and safety Minister to" hold back its publication".

This report by this independent commission of South African crime experts also confirms earlier findings and warnings which were issued by the international human rights organisation Genocide Watch in its December 2002 report -- when they warned that the attackers had racial motives for the violence which targetted Afrikaner -Boer farm dwellers, that this was ethnicbased violence which unless curbed by the authorities, could deteriorate into all-out genocide of this small, highly-visible South African minority group.

 (see http://www.genocidewatch.org/BoersSlain01.htm) According to the South African state advocates who were quoted in the independent commission's (still unpublished) formal report, racial hatred is an important factor in the violence and cruelty which mark the South African farm attacks targetting Afrikaner farm dwellers.

The racial hatred may not be the driving force of the farm attacks, the main motivation is "the desire to rob or steal." There are also farm attacks identified in this report which were carried out "with political undercurrents but these were in the minority." In 32 of 45 farm attacks studied they could also find "no rational motive for the deaths of the victims" whatsoever.

The committee says although its a misconception that hardly anything valuable is stolen during farm attacks - if attackers take nothing this is due to their having to escape in a hurry. There is no doubt that the farm attacks are being carried out with considerably more violence than routine robberies elsewhere. Victims of farm attacks "have a much greater chance of being murdered" than victims of in-transit robberies or robberies and burglaries carried out in urban homes.

Charles Nqakula, South Africa's safety and security minister confirmed that the report was held back for publication -- in spite of its previously-announced, formally scheduled release to the public on Wednesday. His spokesman Les Xingwa, would not say why the ministers were unhappy about it. And members of the independent commission which had been appointed by the government to investigate the undelrying causes of the farm violence, also denied claims by the Minsiter that the report had been sent back to them for a rewrite.
"The provincial Ministers in charge of safety and security for all nine provinces are planning a meeting with the independent commission to ask them questions and obtain further information," said a commission member.
The date for this meeting has not yet been set. The commission report's statistics claim that between 1991 and up to 2001 there had been 6,122 farm attacks in which 1,254 people were murdered.
In 2001 there were 147 people killed in 1,011 attacks.
In 2002 there were 112 people killed in 1,000 attacks.
This brings the total number of farm attacks since 1991 up to and including 2002 to 9,154 in which a total of 1,613 people were murdered.

The official 2003 farm attack statistics are not yet known. The commission report also confirmed a growing trend which has also been noticed by the Censorbugbears -- namely that in some cases such as in KwaZulu-Natal, illegal land occupations also lead to farm attacks and high levels of violence including torture, maiming and murders.

Furthermore, these illegal land occupations are on the increase and "this is a large source of concern" to the commission. In interviews with convicted farm attackers in prisons, it was also found that "young, unemployed black men with a low educational level are primarily involved in the vast majority of farm attacks. "Most of the attackers also come from 'disfunctional families'. Most of these attackers also told the interviewers that the victims "could escape violence if they did not resist..."

 However this comment did not explain why so many totally defenceless victims -- infants, frail elderly, sleeping farm dwellers -- had been murdered, or why so many farm dwellers had been tied up and extensively tortured.

 Convicted attackers, when questioned about this high level of cruelty and violence, admitted that they had been this violent because they hated their Afrikaner victims and saw them as "dogs" rather than people; and that they killed and tortured and raped for this reason.

The interviewed farm attackers also invaribly described the Afrikaner victims as "Maburu"(the Xhosa-Zulu word for Boers) and which was a term which they considered derogatory, a degrading term for this ethnic minority of South Africa. The report also noted that more than half of the farmers and farm dwellers did not
have "basic security measures" such as burglar bars, electrified fencing and vicious guard dogs.
http://www.news24.com/Beeld/Suid-Afrika/0,,3-975_1405425,00.html